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Parenthood Status and Compensation
in Law Practice
NANCY REICHMAN* & JOYCE STERLINGt
ABSTRACT

This article asks how cultural frameworks of status influence the
evaluation of performance including compensation and advancement of
lawyers who were seven years into their practice. We borrow from the
work on status expectations that goes beyond gender distinctions and
assesses whether the concept of motherhood has a negative impact on
assessment of female lawyers. Status expectations theory hypothesizes
that mothers are valued less because they are less committed to the
workplace and thus receive a motherhood penalty while men receive a
fatherhood bonus in compensation decisions. Employing data from the
After The JD study, we test the impact of parenthood on compensation
decisions. Our analysis reveals that gender matters more than
parenthoodstatus in compensation. Thus we conclude that parenthood is
not found to have a significant effect on credentials,orientation to work,
or practice setting.
INTRODUCTION

The gender gap in compensation persists and grows, despite the
increased representation of women in the legal profession over the last
two decades.' In the first-wave analysis of After the JD (AJD), a

* Professor Nancy Reichman is Professor of Sociology and Criminology at University
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t Professor Joyce Sterling is Professor of Law at University of Denver, Sturm College
of Law.
1. See generally Ronit Dinovitzer, Nancy J. Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, The
Differential Valuation of Women's Work: A New Look at the Gender Gap in Lawyers'
Incomes, 88 Soc. FORCES 819 (2009) [hereinafter Differential Valuation]; Nancy J.
Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, Recasting the Brass Ring: Deconstructing and
Reconstructing Workplace Opportunitiesfor Women Lawyers, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 923 (2002)
[hereinafter Brass Ring]; Nancy J. Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, Sticky Floors, Broken
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national longitudinal study of the career trajectories of lawyers who
passed the bar in 2000, we found a gender gap of nearly $6,000: the
average salary for women was $90,527 compared to the average of
$96,486 for men. 2 In the second wave of the study and after seven years
of practice, the gap is much larger, almost $20,000, with women
reporting an average salary of $94,145 compared to the $114,426
average for men.3 How can we make sense of the continuing increase in
the income gap given the increased presence of women in the
profession?
Although the literature is ripe with theoretical frameworks that
differ in focus and nuance, in general we find three overarching
explanations for gender disparities. One strand of research develops an
economic model of discrimination that follows the work of Gary Becker. 4
These explanations account for disparity by examining differences in
the accumulation of human capital (e.g. hours worked, law school
attended, and other accumulated attributes) and argue that women are
more likely to invest in family than careers.5 Becker's classic "taste for
discrimination" model suggests that employers' compensation decisions
are related to their interest in attracting or avoiding certain groups of
workers, a perspective influenced by prejudice or ignorance.6 Since
discrimination is inherently inefficient, Becker believed that market
competition would ultimately eliminate it.7
A second general category of explanation focuses on the "choices"
women make to reduce work experience (time and effort). While some
who follow this perspective focus on the pull of families, others more
accurately recognize choice as mediated by workplace structures that
are inhospitable to women. 8 From this perspective, the choice to stay
Steps, and Concrete Ceiling in Legal Careers,14 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 27 (2004) [hereinafter
Sticky Floors].
2. Differential Valuation, supra note 1, at 828.
3. Joyce S. Sterling & Nancy Reichman, Navigating the Gap: Reflections on 20 Years
Researching Gender Disparities in the Legal Profession, 8(2) FLORIDA INTL. L.R.
(Forthcoming 2013); RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD II: SECOND RESULTS FROM A
NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS (2009) [hereinafter AJD2].
4. See generally GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION (3d ed. 1993).
5. See generally Jacob Mincer & Solomon Polachek, Family Investments in Human
Capital:Earningsof Women, 82 J. POL. ECON. S76 (1974).
6. See generally Asa Ros6n, Search, Bargaining,and Employer Discrimination,21 J.
LAB. ECON. 807 (2003).
7. See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
8. For evidence about how women are pushed out of the workplace, rather than exits
simply being a matter of choice, see Joan C. Williams et.al., "Opt-Out" Or Pushed Out?
How The Press Covers Work/Family Conflict, WORK LIFE LAw, UC HASTINGS COLLEGE OF
THE LAW, 44, 48 (2006).
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home with children is always made within a context where women see
more or less possibility for career advancement; women are "pushed"
from work at the same time they are "pulled" toward home.9
A third strand of research investigates the role that "cultural
superschema" play in the persistent inequalities that women face.10
Here, the focus is on the cultural constructions of performance that
attach to particular statuses, e.g. gender, so that some groups are
viewed as more or less worthy than others." As these cultural schemas
profoundly influence the assessment of competence, commitment, and
performance, they also create barriers to the advancement of workers
who are culturally defined as less worthy.12 Theorists in this tradition
provide an answer to why inequality and discrimination persist even
when employers do not exhibit prejudicial attitudes. Consistent with
status expectations, employers will prefer one status group-male
lawyers in the present instance-over another because they perceive

9. For literature on choice, see generally ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION,
THE UNFINISHED AGENDA: WOMEN AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2001); CYNTHIA FUCHS
EPSTEIN ET AL., THE PART-TIME PARADOX: TIME NORMS, PROFESSIONAL LIFE, FAMILY AND
GENDER (1999); KATHLEEN GERSON, HARD CHOICES: How WOMEN DECIDE ABOUT WORK,
CAREER, AND MOTHERHOOD (1985); JOHN HAGAN & FIONA KAY, GENDER IN PRACTICE: A
STUDY OF LAWYERS' LIVES (1995); JERRY A. JACOBS & KATHLEEN GERSON, THE TIME
DIVIDE: WORK, FAMILY, AND GENDER INEQUALITY (2004); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING
GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2000) [hereinafter
UNBENDING GENDER]; Joan C. Williams et al., supra note 8; Michael Betz & Lenahan
O'Connell, Work Orientations of Males and Females: Exploring the Gender Socialization
Approach, 59 Soc. INQUIRY 318 (1989); Denise D. Bielby & William T. Bielby, She Works
Hard for the Money: Household Responsibilities and the Allocation of Work Effort, 93 AM.
J. Soc. 1031 (1988); Denise Del Vento Bielby & William T. Bielby, Work Commitment, SexRole Attitudes, and Women's Employment, 49 AM. Soc. REV. 234 (1984); Margaret Mooney
Marini et al., Gender and Job Values, 69 Soc. EDUC. 49 (1996); Christine Percheski,
Opting Out? Cohort Differences in Professional Women's Employment Rates from 1960 to
2005, 73 AM. Soc. REV. 497 (2008); Brass Ring, supra note 1; Deborah L. Rhode, The "NoProblem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731 (1991);
Carroll Seron & Kerry Ferris, NegotiatingProfessionalism: The Gendered Social Capitalof
Flexible Time, 22 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 22 (1995); Pamela Stone & Meg Lovejoy, Fast
Track Women and the "Choice" to Stay Home, 596 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 62
(2004).
10. See generally CECILIA L. RIDGEWAY, FRAMED BY GENDER: How GENDER INEQUALITY
PERSISTS IN THE MODERN WORLD (2011). For the original formulation of this theory, see
generally JOSEPH BERGER ET AL., STATUS CHARACTERISTICS AND SOCIAL INTERACTION: AN
EXPECTATION-STATES APPROACH (1977); David G. Wagner & Joseph Berger, Expectations
States Theory: An Evolving Research Program, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 41 (Joseph Berger & Morris Zelditch Jr. eds., 2002).
11. See Shelley J. Correll & Stephen Benard, Biased Estimators? Comparing Status
and Statistical Theories of Gender Discrimination, 23 ADVANCES GROUP PROCESSES 89
(2006) [hereinafter Biased].
12. See id. at 91.
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them as more competent and worthy. 13 The evaluation of potential and
actual performance becomes a "self-fulfilling prophesy" when certain
status actors (male lawyers) are given more opportunities to participate
and to demonstrate their competence in the workplace. When employers
have higher performance expectations for men, they provide men with
more opportunities to participate and excel in the workplace, and
subsequently they are more likely to interpret men's performances to be
superior to those of women. 14 Status expectations theory also
contributes to our understanding of double standards.1 5 Lower status
actors (women) receive stricter scrutiny in task performance, and,
regardless of their achievements, they are viewed as underperforming
compared to high status actors.
I. MOTHERHOOD PENALTIES, FATHERHOOD BONUSES-EVIDENCE FROM
PAST RESEARCH?

This paper attempts to build on our understanding of how cultural
frameworks of status influence the evaluation of performance and, thus,
compensation and advancement. Importantly, over the last decade, the
literature on status expectations has shifted attention away from a
simple gender distinction to explore the concept of motherhood as an
important status in its own right.16 Simply put, mothers are viewed as
less status worthy and less competent than fathers.17 The association of
mothers and fathers with a traditional gender division of labor leads to
the assumption that fathers have a greater motivation and commitment
to work, while mothers would prefer to stay home and take care of
children. These role stereotypes become important "background" for
assessments such that men may receive a "daddy bonus,"18 while women
13. Cf. John J. Donohue III & James J. Heckman, The Law and Economics of Racial
Discriminationin Employment: Re-Evaluating Federal Civil Rights Policy, 79 GEO. L.J.
1713 (1991). They have argued that discrimination is reinforced by cultural norms.
14. Biased, supranote 11, at 107.
15. See generally Martha Foschi, Status Characteristics,Standards, and Attributions,
in SOCIOLOGIcAL THEORIES IN PROGRESS: NEW FORMULATIONS 58 (Joseph Berger et al.
eds., 1989).
16. See generally RIDGEWAY, supra note 10; Michelle J. Budig & Melissa J. Hodges,
Differences in Disadvantage: Variation in the Motherhood Penalty across White Women's
Earnings Distribution,75 AM. Soc. REV. 705 (2010); Biased, supra note 11, at 93; Cecilia
L. Ridgeway & Shelley J. Correll, Motherhood as a Status Characteristic,60 J. Soc.
ISSUES 683 (2004) [hereinafter Motherhood].
17. See Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM.
J. SOC. 1297, 1298 (2007) [hereinafter Getting a Job]; Motherhood, supra note 16, at
684-85.
18. See generally Joni Hersch & Leslie S. Stratton, Household Specialization and the
Male Marriage Wage Premium, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 78 (2000); Martha S. Hill, The
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receive a "mother penalty"'9 in compensation decisions. 20 Research
shows that married men earn higher wages than unmarried men. 21
Audit studies or field experiments test employers' responses to mothers.
Resumes are sent to employers that vary only on the parent status of
the applicants in a subtle way. 22 These studies reveal that women
receive fewer employment offers, lower salary offers to similarly
qualified women, and are less likely to be promoted when the resume
has subtle indications that the female applicant is a mother. 23 The same
bias does not seem to operate for men or for women who are portrayed
in the audit studies as not being mothers. 24 Being a good father is not
seen as incompatible with being an ideal worker. In fact, the research by
Melissa Hodges and Michelle Budig suggests that there is a "daddy
bonus." 25
The significance of parenthood status is underscored by research
that finds that the pay gaps between mothers and nonmothers is larger

Wage Effects of Marital Status and Children, 14 J. HUM. RESOURCES 579 (1979); Melissa
J. Hodges & Michelle J. Budig, Who Gets the Daddy Bonus?: Organizational Hegemonic
Masculinity and the Impact of Fatherhood on Earnings, 24 GENDER & Soc'Y 717 (2010)
[hereinafter Daddy Bonus]; Sanders Korenman & David Neumark, Does MarriageReally
Make Men More Productive?, 26 J. HUM. RESOURCES 282 (1991); Eng Seng Loh,
Productivity Differences and the Marriage Wage Premium for White Males, 31 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 566 (1996).
19. See generally HEATHER JOSHI & MARIE-LOUISE NEWELL, PAY DIFFERENTIALS AND
PARENTHOOD: ANALYSIS OF MEN AND WOMEN BORN IN 1946 (1989); Michelle J. Budig &
Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 AM. Soc. REV. 204 (2001); Amy J.C.
Cuddy et al., When Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth Doesn't Cut the Ice, 60 J. Soc.
ISSUES 701 (2004); Jennifer Glass, Blessing or Curse? Work-Family Policies and Mother's
Wage Growth Over Time, 31 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 367 (2004); Shelly Lundberg & Elaina
Rose, The Effects of Sons and Daughters on Men's Labor Supply and Wages, 84 REV.
EcoN. & STAT. 251 (2002); David Neumark & Sanders Korenman, Sources of Bias in
Women's Wage Equations:Results Using Siblings Data,29 J. HUM. RESOURCES 379 (1994);
Motherhood, supra note 16, at 684-85; Jane Waldfogel, The Effect of Children on Women's
Wages, 62 AM. Soc. REV. 209 (1997); Jane Waldfogel, The Family Gap for Young Women in
the United States and Britain: Can Maternity Leave Make a Difference?, 16 J. LA3. ECON.
505 (1998); Jane Waldfogel, Understanding the 'Tamily Gap" in Pay for Women with
Children, 12 J. EcoN. PERSP. 137 (1998).
20. For evidence of motherhood penalties in wages, see Michelle J. Budig & Paula
England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 AM. Soc. REV. 204 (2001). A recent review
of the research on motherhood wage penalties is found in Margaret Gough & Mary
Noonan, A Review of the Motherhood Wage Penalty in the United States, 7(4) SOCIOLOGY
COMPASS 328-342 (2013).
21. Loh, supranote 18, at 566.
22. See Getting a Job, supra note 17, at 1297.
23. See id. at 1330.
24. See id. at 1298; Motherhood, supra note 16, at 697. See also MARY BLAIR-LOY,
COMPETING DEVOTIONS: CAREER AND FAMILY AMONG WOMEN EXECUTIVES (2003).
25. Daddy Bonus, supra note 18.
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than the gap between men and women. 26 But to be clear, these
stereotyped evaluations may persist absent empirical evidence of
parenthood. Women may be disadvantaged based on the assumption
that they may become mothers at some point. 27
There is a growing body of research that finds that the motherhood
penalty exists in more than a dozen countries in Europe and North
America, 28 including Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany,
Finland, and Sweden. 29 Researchers also find the motherhood penalty in
studies of compensation from Austria, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Canada, Belgium, and France. 30 Not only does it exist, but
also it appears to be stable over time.31
Studies of the motherhood penalty have employed laboratory
experiments, audit studies, 32 and analysis of the longitudinal survey
data, such as the National Longitudinal Study of Youth. 33 All together,
these studies consider the role of demographics and background
credentials, family status, nature of the employment setting, and
perceptions of performance evaluation in producing penalties for
motherhood. Using survey data, Budig and Hodges were one of the first
to consider a broad distribution of wages to assess whether size of
earnings influences the motherhood penalty. 34 Although they find
significant motherhood penalties at all earnings levels, low

26. See generally ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST
IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED (2001) (examining the effect
motherhood has on pay).
27. See Sticky Floors, supra note 1, at 71 (describing the assumption that women are
"less committed to the practice of law because they have other responsibilities").
28. See, e.g., Stephen Benard & Shelley J. Correll, Normative Discriminationand the
Motherhood Penalty, 24 GENDER & SOC'Y 616, 616 (2010).
29. See SUSAN HARKNESS & JANE WALDFOGEL, CTR. FOR ANALYSIS OF Soc. ExcLusION,
THE FAMILY GAP IN PAY: EVIDENCE FROM SEVEN INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES, at iv (1999)
(presenting research on the difference in hourly wages for women with and without
children).
30. See Joya Misra et al., Employment, Wages, and Poverty: Reconciliation Policies
available at
(unpublished paper),
2005)
Equity
(Apr. 13,
and Gender
http://www.academia.edu/647485/EmploymentWages-andPovertyReconciliationPolici
esand_Gender._Equity (evaluating welfare state strategies and effects on the motherhood
penalty).
31. See Sarah Avellar & Pamela J. Smock, Has the Price of Motherhood Declined Over

Time? A Cross-Cohort Comparison of the Motherhood Wage Penalty, 65 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 597 (2003) (discussing the gender gap across time).
32. See Motherhood, supranote 16, at 685; Getting a Job, supra note 17, at 1298, 1309.
33. See Budig & England, supranote 19, at 204; Daddy Bonus, supranote 18, at 717.
34. See Budig & Hodges, supra note 16, at 705-06 (studying white women's earnings
distribution).
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wage-earning women incur the largest penalties for being a mother.3 5
Most significantly, they find that the only female wage earners who do

not experience a motherhood penalty are those women in the very
highest wage category (90-95th percentile). 36 Although research
consistently demonstrates that one-quarter to one-third of the wage
penalty is attributed to human capital differences,37 only a few studies
suggest that the motherhood penalty varies with skill level. 38
Motherhood penalties have been linked to the number of children
and timing of childbirth; Budig and Paula England found that the
motherhood penalty increased with the birth of each additional child.39
The length of time out after the birth of a child is inversely related to
income and advancement, even in countries as family friendly as
Sweden. 40 The relationship between motherhood penalties and mobility
is mixed. Some research indicates that mobility after maternity may
result in lower earnings;41 remaining with the same employer can
minimize the motherhood penalty. 42 However, Budig and Hodges find
that those who change jobs after maternity leave actually have smaller
penalties than those who stay with the same employer. 43

35. See id. See also Deborah J. Anderson et al., The Motherhood Wage Penalty
Revisited: Experience, Heterogeneity, Work Effort, and Work-Schedule Flexibility, 56
INDuS. & LAB. REL. REV. 273 (2003) (explaining the motherhood penalty in high school
graduate mothers); Avellar & Smock, supra note 31; Rebecca Glauber, Marriage and the
Motherhood Wage Penalty among African Americans, Hispanics, and Whites, 69 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 951 (2007) (explaining the "effects of race and marriage on the
motherhood wage penalty").
36. See Budig & Hodges, supra note 16, at 721, 724.
37. See Budig & England, supra note 19, at 214. See also Markus Gangl & Andrea
Ziefle, Motherhood,Labor Force Behavior, and Women's Careers:An EmpiricalAssessment
of the Wage Penalty for Motherhood in Britain, Germany, and the United States, 46
DEMOGRAPHY 341 (2009).
38. See DAVID ELLWOOD ET AL., THE MOMMY TRACK DIVIDES: THE IMPACT OF
CHILDBEARING ON WAGES OF WOMEN OF DIFFERING SKILL LEVELS (2004) (finding that
women with higher skill levels are more greatly affected by the motherhood wage penalty,
which contradicts previous studies).
39. Budig & England, supra note 19, at 217.
40. See Silke Aisenbrey et al., Is There a Career Penalty for Mothers' Time Out? A
Comparison of Germany, Sweden and the United States, 88 Soc. FORCES 573 (2009)
(finding career penalties for both short-term and long-term breaks in the United States
and a penalty in Germany that increases with the time of the break).
41. See, e.g., Sylvia Fuller, Job Mobility and Wage Trajectories for Men and Women in
the United States, 73 Am. Soc. REV. 158 (2008).
42. See Gangl & Ziefle, supra note 37, at 347.
43. Budig & Hodges, supranote 16, at 720.
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Other factors influencing motherhood penalties that have been
asserted but not confirmed empirically include the timing of children 44
and the significance of family friendly policies. 45 Finally, many scholars
argue that women, with and without children, will never live up to
expectations of the "ideal worker."4 6
II. RESEARCH QUESTION
What is the relationship between parenthood status and lawyer
compensation? Since the AJD survey is limited to lawyers in a specific
cohort, it offers a unique perspective on this question. The sample
closely approximates the distribution of lawyers across firm,
government, and business employers. The gender composition closely
matches data published by the American Bar Association. 47
Most studies of motherhood penalties isolate their focus on the
comparison of mothers and nonmotherS48 or the comparison of fathers
and nonfathers. 49 Very few have joined the four parenthood categories
(mothers/fathers and nonmothers/nonfathers) as we do below. Unlike
much of the existing research where the small number of minority
respondents does not allow researchers to assess the effect of minority
status, we are able to explore the relationship between race and
parenthood. We begin our analysis by examining the relationship
between parenthood and a range of independent variables, which were
previously identified as factors that influence compensation decisions.
These include the demographics and credentials that lawyers bring to
their practice, the organizational settings where lawyers work, the
lawyers' orientations to work and satisfaction, and the indicators of
performance. The second part of the analysis looks specifically at the
relationship between compensation and parenthood.

44. See Hiromi Taniguchi, The Timing of Childbearing and Women's Wages, 61 J.
& FAM. 1008 (1999) (asserting that women who postpone motherhood may incur
a zero to minimal wage penalty).
45. See Glass, supra note 19, at 380.
46. See generally UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 9.
47. ABA, Section on Legal Education, First Year Enrollment in ABA Approved Law
Schools 1947-2004 (Percentage of Women) (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/
legaled/statistics/femstats.html.
48. Budig & England, supranote 19, at 204.
49. See generally Hodges & Budig, supra note 16.
MARRIAGE
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III. DATA AND MEASURES

A. After the JD Study
The research that serves as the basis for this paper is from the
second wave of data from the AJD study.5 0 This is the first national
longitudinal survey of law graduates in the United States.5 1 The sample
is representative of the national population of lawyers who were
admitted to the bar in 2000 and graduated from law school June 1998
through July 2000.52 The sampling design used a two-stage process. "In
the first stage, the nation was divided into eighteen strata by region and
size of the new lawyer population." 53 "Within each stratum, one primary
sampling unit (PSU)-metropolitan area, portion of a state outside large
metropolitan areas, or entire state-was chosen." 54 "The PSUs included
all four major markets, those with more than 2,000 new lawyers
(Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and Washington, DC); five of the nine
large markets, those with 750 to 2,000 new lawyers [(Boston, Atlanta,
Houston, Minneapolis, and San Francisco)]; and nine of the remaining,
smaller markets [(Connecticut, New Jersey remainder, Florida
remainder, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Indiana, St. Louis, Utah, and
Oregon)]."55 "In the second stage,

. .

. individuals [were sampled] from

each of the PSUs at rates that would, combined, generalize to the
national population." 56 In addition, the study included an "oversample of
1,465 new lawyers from minority groups (black, Hispanic, and Asian)."57
"The final sample included 9,192 lawyers in the eighteen PSUs."5 8 The
first wave (AJD1) data collection relied on a mail questionnaire fielded
in May 2002.59 Researchers followed up with nonrespondents by mail
and phone, with the telephone using a somewhat abridged version of the
mail questionnaire. During the first wave, of the sample members "who
were located and who met the criteria for inclusion in the study, 71

50. AJD2, supra note 3.
51. RoNIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD: FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF
LEGAL CAREERS 13 (2004) [hereinafter AJD1].
52. AJD2, supra note 3, at 12.
53. AJD1, supra note 51, at 89.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. The sample also included respondents who self-identified as Native Americans,
however the number of respondents in this category is too small for the present analysis.
Id. at 67.
58. Id. at 89.
59. Id.
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percent responded either to the mail questionnaire or to a telephone
interview for a total of 4,538 valid responses."6 0
A second wave of AJD (AJD2) was designed to locate and survey the
entire original sample constructed in AJD1 and to trace the career
progression after approximately seven years in practice. The locating
process was extensive and included searching for those in the original
AJD1 sample who had not been located or who had not responded.6 1 A
total of 70.4 percent of the AJD2 respondents had previously
responded. 62 Our paper focuses on the 2,890 respondents who completed
both AJD1 and AJD2 questionnaires (N = 2890).

B. Measures
1. Compensation
Since we focus on the earnings of lawyers as professionals, we adopt
a measure of compensation that includes three components: salary,
bonus, and profit sharing-all measured on an annual basis. Our
measure of compensation is based on self-reported lawyers' annual
earnings at the time of the second wave survey. As is common practice,
our analyses rely on the natural log of compensation to reduce
heteroskedasticity. 63

2. Parenthood
While many of the AJD respondents had become parents, slightly
less than half were without children when they were surveyed in 2007.64
To examine the effect of parenthood status, we created four distinct
parenthood groups to reflect that not having a child is a parenthood
status too. Our parenthood statuses included: Mothers, Fathers, Women
Without Children (WWC), and Men Without Children (MWC).

3. Components of Law Practice
Our goal is to understand how parenthood affects lawyers' practice
methods and the compensation they earn. We include a range of factors
60. Id. at 90.
61. AJD2, supranote 3, at 12.

62. Id.
63. Heteroskedasticity describes a data sample or data-generating process in which the
variances in the population distribution differ for the values of the independent variables.
See DAVID KNOKE & GEORGE W. BOHRNSTEDT, BASIC SOCIAL STATISTICS (1991).
64. Id. at 69.
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related to law practice that our first wave analysis of compensation
revealed as important to understanding compensation. These include
demographics, previous experience, and work structures.6 5 To these
factors we added lawyers' orientation to work and performance
indicators. Since many of our respondents changed jobs between the two
waves of the survey, we were interested in what factors mattered most
to them as they made a decision to accept their current position. With
longer tenure in the profession, performance measures begin to matter
more.
a. Demographics
We include a range of demographic characteristics-including race,
age, and marital status-that prior research indicates have important
relationships with compensation. The ages of respondents are their
actual ages as of 2007.
b. Previous Experience
These variables measure the effect of both law school background
and type of practice setting from the first wave. We include the
credentials from law school, both self-reported law school GPA and a
variable reflecting law school rank. For law school rank, we created a
dummy variable to measure whether respondents attended an elite law
school, operationalized as a top twenty law school.66 A third variable
captures the accumulated human and social capital from working in a
firm with more than 100 lawyers.6 7
c. Orientationto Work
To capture the respondents' orientation to work, we measure factors
that were important in job selection and satisfaction with current
employment. We introduce three independent variables that reflect
respondents' orientation to their current employment. A factor analysis
of second wave responses to questions about the importance of factors in
their decision to take on their current position uncovered two clusters
that we call Career and Lifestyle. Career is a composite measure
65. See Dinovitzer, et al., supranote 1, at 826-27.
66. See id. at 830. We follow the 2003 U.S. News & World Report rankings.
67. See generally Ronit Dinovitzer, The FinancialRewards of Elite Status in the Legal
Profession, 36 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 971 (2011) (finding that "inherited cultural capital
produces an earnings advantage as soon as lawyers begin their careers and that this gap
persists over time").
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compiled from the responses to how important the following items were
to respondents' decisions to assume their current job: salary, benefits,
prospects for advancement, prestige of the organization, diversity of the
workplace, and opportunity to develop specific skills. We recognize that
these reflect attention to the career development potential of their
employment.
The second composite measure focused on the importance of what
we describe as lifestyle factors. This composite measure focuses on office
environment/collegiality, hours expected, location, potential to balance
work and personal life, opportunity to do socially responsible work, and
match of employer's mission with the lawyer's mission. We calculated
each of the composite measures by totaling the Likert scale scores and
then calculating a mean for each respondent. These measures are scored
from low (not important = 1) to high (very important = 7). Based on a
factor analysis of the sixteen measures collected on job satisfaction, we
employ three dimensions of satisfaction that emerged from the first
wave analysis:6 8 The first dimension, "job setting satisfaction," includes
recognition received at work, relationships with colleagues, control over
the work, and job security. The second dimension, "work substance
satisfaction," reflects the intrinsic interest of the work. Finally, the third
dimension, "power track satisfaction," is composed of two items:
satisfaction
with compensation
levels and satisfaction with
opportunities for advancement.
d. Structure of Work
The structure of work introduces a series of dummy variables to
represent the type of practice setting where respondents were employed
after seven years of practice. Our measures of practice setting rely on
the size of respondents' entire firm rather than the local office in which
they work. This selection of firm size was chosen because salaries are
driven by the national scale of a firm rather than by its local position.
Following our previous analysis of AJD1 income inequality, dummy
variables were introduced for solo practice, small firms (2-20 lawyers),
medium firms (21-100 lawyers), large firms (101-250 lawyers), and
mega firms (over 250 lawyers). Because of the shifts out of private firm
practice, we introduced dummy variables for business, nonprofit, and
government practice. As market was an important predictor in the
analysis of AJD1 data, we introduced two dummy variables to reflect
the size of the labor market in which respondents are located. These

68. See Ronit Dinovitzer & Bryant Garth, Lawyer Satisfaction in the Process of
StructuringLegal Careers,41 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 1, 10 (2007).
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markets are the mega markets and large markets. The categories
correspond with the original sampling design that reflects the number
of lawyers admitted per year within the markets. The mega market
refers to geographical locations where more than 2,000 lawyers are
admitted per year. Large markets are those admitting between 750 and
2,000 lawyers per year. Because of the dispersal of lawyers between the
survey times, we found it nearly impossible to identify midrange
markets with any accuracy.
e. Performance
Finally, we introduced three variables to reflect effort and
performance of these lawyers in their workplaces. The first reflects the
types of clients represented in the respondents' current job. We created
a dummy variable, clients, to reflect lawyers who spend 25 percent or
more of their time representing high-income individuals, Fortune 500
businesses, or other large or middle-sized businesses. Thirty-one
percent of our respondents represent these high profile parties at least
25 percent of the time. We include two measures of work effort: the log
of total hours worked last week and the billable hours reported for the
preceding year.
IV. METHODOLOGY

To examine the relationship between parenthood status and the key
variables identified as important predictors of income, we used Analysis
of Variance (ANOVA).69 ANOVA is a statistical measure that tests
whether there are any significant differences in the means of three or
more independent groups. 70 A finding of significant difference indicates
that we have confidence that the differences that we observe in the data
reflect a pattern and have not occurred by chance. The ANOVA
procedure requires that the variances in our predictors of income are
equal among groups. This was the case for some, but not all, of the
variables we analyzed. When that statistical requirement was not met,
we used the Kruskal-Wallis equality of populations rank test to adjust
for the violation of equal variances and to confirm/disconfirm our
findings of difference.
69. For a model predicting income during Wave 1, see Dinovitzer et al., supra note 1.
70. Researchers employed the software package of STATA to calculate the Analysis of
Variance. In addition, Bonferroni tests were calculated and are reported in the tables.
Statistical significance is reported as "p-values" that measure the confidence that the
observations are not the result of chance. We assume statistical significance when we have
95% confidence in our results, i.e., p-values that are less than .05.
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While the ANOVA test provides valuable information that groups
differ, it does not provide information about the specifics of those
differences. As we see below, the ANOVA analysis tells us that
parenthood produces a significant effect on compensation. However, the
ANOVA does not tell us where that effect occurs. The significant
difference could be between any or all of the different parenthood
statuses. To determine where the significant differences between
parenthood statuses are found and to unravel some of the interaction
between gender and parenthood, we conducted a Bonferroni test that
allows us to identify which of the different parenthood statuses matter
most, if at all. Unless otherwise stated, the "p"values reported in the
text refer to the Bonferroni test of differences.
V. PARENTHOOD AND ITS EFFECT ON FACTORS THAT PREDICT
COMPENSATION

The first set of analyses seeks to examine how parenthood status
matters to the key variables previously identified as important to
understanding compensation.

A. Demographics
Not surprisingly, lawyers with children were more likely to be
married than lawyers without children. Given the cohort design of our
sample, age was not related to parenthood status. However,
interestingly, we find a significant relationship between parenthood
status and minority status (p < .000). Because minority status is coded
as zero (white) or one (nonwhite), the means in Table One need to be
interpreted as how close or far they are from zero or one.

Table 1: Minority Status and Parenthood-Full-Time Lawyers
Mean
SD
Freq
Mothers
.26
.44
522
Fathers
.23
.42
816
Women Without Children .38
.49
520
Men Without Children
.36
.48
619
F = 16.79, p = .000; Kruskal-Wallis Chi-Squared: 75.25 with 3 df,
p = .0001

The mean values of lawyers who did not have children were closer to
the value associated with minority status (mean for WWC = .38 and
mean for MWC = .36) than those who are parents (p < .003). The
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significant relationship between minority status and parenting status
suggests that minority lawyers may choose to delay parenthood or not
be parents at all, perhaps to avoid an additional complication to what
previous research suggests is an already complicated relationship for
minorities in law. 7
B. Previous Experience
Parenthood does not appear related to previous experience, with one
surprising exception: a small difference in law school grade point
average (p < .04). Here, the only difference between groups that is
statistically significant is the difference between fathers and men
without children; men without children had lower law school grades
than their counterparts who were fathers (p < .025).
C. Orientationto Work
We find differences by parenthood status in the career orientation
that lawyers bring to their job, although the main effect is limited to the
differences between men and women. Men without children were less
oriented to the career development aspects of their jobs than women
without children. While there is no difference between mothers' and
fathers' career orientation, for those without children, gender matters.
Women without children were more focused on their career development
than men without children.
Not surprisingly, we find a relationship between parenthood status
and the significance of lifestyle factors in the decision to take on current
positions. Table Two presents the mean values of the importance of
lifestyle factors, scored from one (not important) to seven (very
important).

71. See David B. Wilkins, From "Separateis Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity is Good
for Business": The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black
Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1589-90 (2004) (detailing the complicated
relationship between minority lawyers and law firms). See generally David B. Wilkins &
G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms?: An
Institutional Analysis, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 493, 526-27 (1996) (examining "the institutional
factors that tend to perpetuate the existing underrepresentation" of black lawyers in large
corporate firms).
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Table 2: The Importance of Lifestyle and Parenthood StatusFull-Time
Mothers
Fathers
Women Without Children
Men Without Children

Mean
5.02
4.57
4.89
4.52

SD
1.16
1.16
1.19
1.20

Freg
431
626
443
469

F = 20.48, p = .001

Most significantly, gender, not motherhood, explains the different
group effects. Mothers and women without children rated lifestyle
factors as more important to their decisions to take on their current jobs
than fathers or men without children (p < .001). Even so, the relative
mean values (five out of a seven point scale) suggest that lifestyle is only
somewhat important to how lawyers decide about job opportunities.

D. Structure of Work
Parents and nonparents are differently distributed across practice
settings. Table Three presents the percentage of lawyers within each
parenthood status that work in the different practice contexts. Separate
ANOVA analysis of practice settings by parenthood status reveals that
parenthood status does not have a statistically significant effect on
where one practices with the exception of the nonprofit sector. Women,
both mothers and women without children, were more likely to be found
practicing in nonprofit sectors than their male counterparts.
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Table 3: The Distribution of Parenthood Status Across Practice

Mothers

Fathers

Women w/o
Children

Men w/o
Children

Solo

6.0%

8.3%

5.3%

10.6%

Firm, 2-20

16.4%

20.6%

16.7%

19.5%

Firm, 21-100

9.5%

10.4%

8.9%

11.6%

Firm, 101-250

3.9%

6.0%

5.9%

4.8%

Firm 251+

13.2%

15.8%

10.8%

13.5%

Government

27.6%

16.7%

27.4%

17.2%

Nonprofit

6.0%

3.5%

6.7%

3.4%

Business

17.4%

18.6%

18.2%

19.3%

Total
N=

517

778

492

584

Pearson Chi Square = 74.4901, p = .000
Parenthood is associated with whether a lawyer practices in one of
the mega markets (F = 10.23, p < .000). The group effect that matters
here is only evident for women without children who demonstrated a
greater tendency than mothers or fathers to practice in large markets
(p < .000).

E. Performance
Parenthood status has an effect on experience working with high
profile clients (F = 4.89, p < .002). Fathers had more experience working
with high profile clients than either mothers or women without
children. There is no statistical difference between fathers and men
without children with respect to how often they worked with high
profile clients. This is consistent with men having more opportunities to
engage in work that yields larger rewards.
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We find that parenthood status affects reported hours worked last
week (F = 16.4, p < .000), but as others have shown, it is gender that
matters more. Regardless of whether they were parents, women
reported working fewer hours than men (p < .001). However, when
examining the number of billable hours reported for the preceding
year, 72 we find important differences by parenthood status (Table Four),
specifically in the different effects between mothers and women without
children (p < .036) and between mothers and fathers (p < .001).

Table 4: Parenthood Status and Billable Hours
Mean
SD
Freq
Mothers
1725
459
191
Fathers
1879
Women Without Childrer 1833
Men Without Children
1841

447
430
454

385
184
283

F = 5.05, p = .002
VI. PARENTHOOD AND COMPENSATION

The comparison of mean compensation by parenthood status in
Table Five demonstrates the significant effects of gender regardless of
parenthood status on overall compensation. Fathers earn more than
mothers (p < .000) and women without children (p < .000). Men without
children earn more than women regardless of whether the woman has a
child or not (p < .002).

Table 5: Compensation
Employment
Mothers
Fathers
Women Without Children
Men Without Children

and
Mean
112093
140988
110491
130199

Parenthood
SD
71408
87175
62404
78354

Status-Full-Time
Freq
453
726
442
518

F = 20.55, p = .000; Kruskal-Wallis, Chi-squared = 78.50, with df = 2

Further analysis of compensation within particular practice settings
revealed few settings where parenthood status had an effect on
compensation. The two exceptions were business and small-firm
practice. In business, we found a tendency toward a fatherhood
72. Of course, this measure is significant only to those contexts where billable hours are
part of the evaluation.
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premium.73 Fathers reported significantly higher compensation than
mothers (p < .027) and women without children (p < .013). The
compensation advantage of fathers over men without children is present
but not statistically significant. In small firms we observe a tendency
toward a motherhood penalty.74
DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION
We did not find that parenthood status had a significant effect on
credentials, orientation to work, or even to where lawyers actually
practice law. In the few instances where we did find an overall effect of
parenthood status, our more in-depth analyses demonstrate that gender
matters more. The primary effect for gender rather than parenthood
status may be an artifact of the career and family stages of our
respondents. If motherhood penalties accumulate as women bear more
children, as some research suggests, we may find a stronger effect for
motherhood in the next wave of AJD.
A few anomalies require more analysis. When compared to men who
do not have children, women who are childless find career development
factors more important to their decisions to accept their current
positions. Women seem to be thinking more strategically than their
male counterparts. Why is that?
The motherhood effect we find for billable hours is not found in our
analysis of reported hours worked. Gender appears to matter more to
reported hours than to whether one is a mother. The different effects
that motherhood has on the hours lawyers work and on billable hours is
an important anomaly that requires more analysis. Do mothers have
fewer opportunities to accumulate billable hours than women without
children and men? If mothers have fewer opportunities for billing hours
compared to women without children, can motherhood stereotyping
explain that outcome? This would certainly be consistent with
status-expectations theory.
In sum, we do not find the motherhood penalty or fatherhood
premium in compensation that has been the subject of intense scholarly
interest over the past decade. In the professional context of law, gender
matters more. It may well be that motherhood and fatherhood effects
are so well embedded in cultural schemas that empirical field research,
as opposed to social experiments, cannot reveal them. As the papers in
73. ANOVA results for the effect of parenthood status on compensation in business:
F = 3.36, p. < .02. See Daddy Bonus, supra note 18 (providing additional evidence about
the fatherhood advantage).
74. ANOVA results for the effect of parenthood on compensation in small firms:
F = 6.01, p. < .001.
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this special issue show, the challenges to empirical measurement of
subtle (normative) discrimination are even greater when working across
cultures.

